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ABSTRACT 
 
Cloud computing is revolutionizing many ecosystems by providing organizations with 
computing resources featuring easy deployment, connectivity, configuration, automation and 
scalability. This paradigm shift raises a broad range of security and privacy issues that must be 
taken into consideration.  Multi-tenancy, loss of control, and trust are key challenges in cloud 
computing environments.  This paper reviews the existing technologies and a wide array of both 
earlier and state-of-the-art projects on cloud security and privacy.  We categorize the existing 
research according to the cloud reference architecture orchestration, resource control, physical 
resource, and cloud service management layers, in addition to reviewing the existing 
developments in privacy-preserving sensitive data approaches in cloud computing such as 
privacy threat modeling and privacy enhancing protocols and solutions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cloud computing is revolutionizing many of our ecosystems, including healthcare. Compared 
with earlier methods of processing data, cloud computing environments provide significant 
benefits, such as the availability of automated tools to assemble, connect, configure and 
reconfigure virtualized resources on demand. These make it much easier to meet organizational 
goals as organizations can easily deploy cloud services. However, the shift in paradigm that 
accompanies the adoption of cloud computing is increasingly giving rise to security and privacy 
considerations relating to facets of cloud computing such as multi-tenancy, trust, loss of control 
and accountability [1]. Consequently cloud platforms that handle sensitive information are 
required to deploy technical measures and organizational safeguards to avoid data protection 
breakdowns that might result in enormous and costly damages. 
 
Sensitive information in the context of cloud computing encompasses data from a wide range of 
different areas and disciplines. Data concerning health is a typical example of the type of 
sensitive information handled in cloud computing environments, and it is obvious that most 
individuals will want information related to their health to be secure. Hence, with the 
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proliferation of these new cloud technologies in recent times, privacy and data protection 
requirements have been evolving to protect individuals against surveillance and database 
disclosure. Some examples of such protective legislation are the EU Data Protection Directive 
(DPD) [2] and the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [3], both of 
which demand privacy preservation for handling personally identifiable information. 
 
This paper presents an overview of the research on security and privacy of sensitive data in cloud 
computing environments. We identify new developments in the areas of orchestration, resource 
control, physical hardware, and cloud service management layers of a cloud provider. We also 
review the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving sensitive data approaches for handling sensitive 
data in cloud computing such as privacy threat modeling and privacy enhancing protocols and 
solutions. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of cloud computing 
concepts and technologies. Section 3 describes the security and privacy issues that need to be 
solved in order to provide secure data management for cloud environments. Section 4, reviews 
the existing security solutions that are being used in the area of cloud computing. Section 5 
describes research on privacy-preserving solutions for sensitive data. Finally, in Section 6, we 
present our findings and conclusions. 
 
2. KEY CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Over the past few years, major IT vendors (such as Amazon, Microsoft and Google) have 
provided virtual machines (VMs), via their clouds, that customers could rent. These clouds utilize 
hardware resources and support live migration of VMs in addition to dynamic load-balancing and 
on-demand provisioning. This means that, by renting VMs via a cloud, the entire datacenter 
footprint of a modern enterprise can be reduced from thousands of physical servers to a few 
hundred (or even just dozens) of hosts. 
 
While it is practical and cost effective to use cloud computing in this way, there can be issues 
with security when using systems that are not provided in-house.  To look into these and find 
appropriate solutions, there are several key concepts and technologies that are widely used in 
cloud computing that need to be understood, such as virtualization mechanisms, varieties of cloud 
services, and “container” technologies. 
 
2.1. Virtualization Mechanisms 
A hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is a key component that resides between VMs 
and hardware to control the virtualized resource [4]. It provides the means to run several isolated 
virtual machines on the same physical host. Hypervisors can be categorized into two groups [5]: 
• Type I: Here the hypervisor runs directly on the real system hardware, and there is no 
operating system (OS) under it. This approach is efficient as it eliminates any 
intermediary layers. Another benefit with this type of hypervisor is that security levels 
can be improved by isolating the guest VMs. That way, if a VM is compromised, it can 
only affect itself and will not interfere with the hypervisor or other guest VMs. 
 
• Type II: The second type of hypervisor runs on a hosted OS that provides virtualization 
services, such as input/output (IO) device support and memory management. All VM 
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interactions, such as IO requests, network operations and interrupts, are handled by the 
hypervisor. 
 
Xen1 and kernel virtual machine (KVM)2 are two popular open-source hypervisors (respectively 
of Type I and Type II). Xen runs directly on the underlying hardware and it inserts a virtualization 
layer between the system hardware and the virtual machines. The OSs running in the VMs 
interact with the virtual resources as if they were actually physical resources. KVM is a 
virtualization feature in the Linux Kernel that makes it possible to safely execute guest code 
directly on the host CPU. 
2.2. Cloud Computing Characteristics 
When considering cloud computing, we need to be aware of the types of services that are offered, 
the way those services are delivered to those using the services, and the different types of people 
and groups that are involved with cloud services. 
Cloud computing delivers computing software, platforms and infrastructures as services based on 
pay-as-you go models. Cloud service models can be deployed for on-demand storage and 
computing power in various ways: Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) 
and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). Cloud computing service models have been evolved 
during the past few years within a variety of domains using the “as-a-Service” concept of cloud 
computing such as Business Integration-as-a-Service, Cloud-Based Analytics-as-a-Service 
(CLAaaS), Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) [61], [62]. This paper refers to the NIST cloud service 
models features [6] that are summarized in Table 1 that can be delivered to consumers using 
different models such as a private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, or hybrid cloud. 
Table 1, Categorization of Cloud Service Models and Features  
Service Model Function Example 
SaaS Allows consumers to run applications by 
virtualizing hardware on the resources of the 
cloud providers 
 
Salesforce Customer 
Relationship Management 
(CRM)3 
PaaS Provides capability of deploying custom 
applications with their dependencies within an 
environment called a container. 
Google App Engine4, 
Heroku5 
IaaS Provides a hardware platform as a service such 
as virtual machines, processing, storage, 
networks and database services. 
Amazon Elastic Compute 
Cloud (EC2)6 
 
                                                           
1
 Xen hypervisor, http://xen.org/products/xenhyp.html 
2
 KVM, http://www.linux-kvm.org/ 
3
 Salesforce CRM, https://www.salesforce.com/crm/ 
4
 Google App Engine, https://appengine.google.com 
5
 Heroku, https://www.heroku.com 
6
 Amazon EC2, https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ 
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The NIST cloud computing reference architecture [7], defines five major actors in the cloud 
arena: cloud consumers, cloud providers, cloud carriers, cloud auditors and cloud brokers. Each 
of these actors is an entity (either a person or an organization) that participates in a cloud 
computing transaction or process, and/or performs cloud computing tasks. 
A cloud consumer is a person or organization that uses services from cloud providers in the 
context of a business relationship. A cloud provider is an entity makes cloud services available to 
interested users. A cloud auditor conducts independent assessments of cloud services, operations, 
performance and security in relation to the cloud deployment. A cloud broker is an entity that 
manages the use, performance and delivery of cloud services, and also establishes relationships 
between cloud providers and cloud consumers. A cloud carrier is an entity that provides 
connectivity and transport of cloud services from cloud providers to cloud consumers through the 
physical networks.  
The activities of cloud providers can be divided into five main categories: service deployment, 
resource abstraction, physical resources, service management, security and privacy [7]. Service 
deployment consists of delivering services to cloud consumers according to one of the service 
models (SaaS, PaaS, IasS). Resource abstraction refers to providing interfaces for interacting 
with networking, storage and compute resources. The physical resources layer includes the 
physical hardware and facilities that are accessible via the resource abstraction layer.  Service 
management includes providing business support, resource provisioning, configuration 
management, portability and interoperability to other cloud providers or brokers. The security 
and privacy responsibilities of cloud providers include integrating solutions to ensure legitimate 
delivery of cloud services to the cloud consumers. The security and privacy features that are 
necessary for the activities of cloud providers are described in Table 2 [10].  
 
Table 2, Security and Privacy Factors of the Cloud Providers  
Security Context Description 
Authentication and 
Authorization 
Authentication and authorization of cloud consumers using pre-
defined identification schemes. 
Identity and Access 
Management 
Cloud consumer provisioning and deprovisioning via heterogeneous 
cloud service providers. 
Confidentiality, 
Integrity, 
Availability 
Assuring the confidentiality of the data objects, authorizing data 
modifications and ensuring that resources are available when needed. 
Monitoring and 
Incident Response 
Continuous monitoring of the cloud infrastructure to assure 
compliance with consumer security policies and auditing 
requirements. 
Policy  
Management 
Defining and enforcing rules for certain actions such as auditing or 
proof of compliance. 
Privacy  Protect personally identifiable information (PII) within the cloud from 
adversarial attacks that aim to find out the identity of the person that 
PII relates to. 
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The majority of cloud computing infrastructures consist of reliable services delivered through 
data centers to achieve high availability through redundancy. A data center or computer center is 
a facility used to house computer systems and associated components, such as storage and 
network systems. It generally includes redundant or backup power units, redundant network 
connections, air conditioning, and fire safety controls. 
2.3. Containers Technology 
Clouds based on Linux container (LXC) technology are considered to be next-generation clouds, 
so LXCs has become an important part of the cloud computing infrastructures because of their 
ability to run several OS-level isolated VMs within a host with a very low overhead. LXCs are 
built on modern kernel features. An LXC resembles a light-weight execution environment within 
a host system that runs instructions native to the core CPU while eliminating the need for 
instruction level emulation or just-in-time compilation [8]. LXCs contain applications, 
configurations and the required storage dependencies, in a manner similar to the just enough OS 
(JeOS). 
Using containers, several applications can share an OS, binaries or libraries, which results in 
significant increases in efficiency compared to using hypervisors. For example, the portability of 
applications and the provisioning time of VMs are very low with container technologies [9]. 
 
LXC technologies were introduced in the 1980s, starting with the chroot (change root) command, 
and evolving into to popular container managers such as Docker. 
• Chroot: The Unix chroot system call, which was introduced as part of Unix version 7 in 
1979, can be considered as the first step in the evolution of containerization. The chroot 
call changes the root directory of the calling process to a specified path, where the root 
directory is known by all children of the calling process. This feature is used by some 
containers for isolation and sharing the underlying file system. Chroot is often used when 
building system images by changing root to a temporary directory, downloading and 
installing packages in chroot or compressing chroot as a system root file system. 
 
• FreeBSD Jail7 extended chroot in 1998 to provide enhanced security. FreeBSD jail 
settings can explicitly restrict access outside the sandbox environment by files, processes, 
and user accounts (including accounts created by the jail definition). Jail can therefore 
define a new root user, who has full control inside the sandbox, but who cannot reach 
anything outside. 
 
• Namespaces were introduced in 1992 [11] for process-based resource isolation. 
Namespaces provide tools for isolating the view of global resources such as details about 
file systems, processes, network interfaces, Inter Process Communication (IPC), host 
names, and user IDs. Processes in a particular namespace are invisible to other processes 
because they think that they are the only processes on the system and because 
"connectivity" is only permitted with the parent namespace 
 
                                                           
7
 https://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/jails.html 
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• Control Groups (cgroups)8 are kernel mechanisms introduced by Google in 2007 to 
provide fine-grained control by grouping processes and their children into a tree structure 
for resource management. Each group can be assigned a task for operations related to 
CPU, memory, disk and network. For example, to isolate two groups such as applications 
resources and OS resources, two groups (group 1 and 2) can be created to assign resource 
profiles to each group. 
 
• Linux Security Modules (LSMs) are kernel modules which provide a framework for 
mandatory access control (MAC) security implementations. In MAC implementations, 
the administrator (user or process) assigns access controls to subject / initiator. In 
discretionary access control (DAC), the resource owner (user) assigns access controls to 
the subject or initiator. Existing LSM implementations include AppArmor, SELinux and 
so forth to prevent virtual machines from attacking other virtual machines or the host. For 
this purpose, policies are used to define what actions a process can perform on a 
particular system. 
 
• Containers are built on the hardware and operating system but they make use of kernel 
features called chroots, cgroups and namespaces to construct a contained environment 
without the need for a hypervisor. The most recent container technologies are Solaris 
Zones, OpenVZ and LXC. 
 
In 2004, Solaris version 10 used zones as facilities to provide protected virtualized 
environments within a single host. Every Solaris system includes a global zone for both 
system and system-wide administrative control, and may have one or more non-global 
zones. All processes run in the global zone if there is no non-global zone. The global 
zone is aware of all devices and all file systems, while non-global zones are not aware of 
the existence of any other zones. Zone-based containers provide isolation, security and 
virtualization. Zones are similar to jails with additional features such as snapshots and 
cloning that make it possible to clone efficiently or to duplicate a current zone into a new 
zone. 
 
In 2005 OpenVZ 9 containers were introduced using a modified Linux kernel with a set 
of extensions. OpenVZ is based on the namespace and control group concepts in contrast 
to jails, which were used in FreeBSD. 
 
Later in 2008, LXC10 emerged as a container management tool and it combined 
namespaces and control groups to create a fully isolated environment. It provides 
libraries and command-line support to enable administrators to create new containers. 
LXC containers can be used in either privileged (as a root user) or unprivileged (as a non-
root user) modes to easily customize kernel capabilities or configure cgroups to satisfy 
the particular requirements. 
 
Docker is another container management tool – it was introduced in 2013 and is based on 
namespaces, cgroups and SELinux. Docker provides automation for the deployment of 
containers through remote APIs and has additional features that make it possible to create 
                                                           
8
 Kernel CGroups, https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroups/ 
9
 OpenVZ, https://openvz.org/ 
10
 LXC Containers, https://linuxcontainers.org/ 
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standardized environments for developing applications. This has made Docker a popular 
technology. Creating the standardized environments is achieved using a layered image 
format that enables users to add or remove applications and their dependencies to form a 
trusted image. 
 
Docker adds portable deployment of LXCs across different machines. In cloud terms, one 
can think of LXC as the hypervisor and Docker as both the open virtualization appliance 
and the provision engine [12]. Docker images can run unchanged on any platform that 
supports Docker. In Docker, containers can be created from build files such as Web 
service management. 
The use of containers in cloud computing is increasingly becoming popular amongst cloud 
providers such as Google11 and Microsoft12. Significant improvements in performance and 
security are the main driving factors for employing containers compared to virtualization using 
hypervisors in cloud infrastructures.   
 
3. CLOUD SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES 
Cloud computing has raised several security threats such as data breaches, data loss, denial of 
service, and malicious insiders that have been extensively studied in [67], [68]. These threats 
mainly originate from issues such as multi-tenancy, loss of control over data and trust. 
(Explanations of these issues follow in the next subsection.)  
 
Consequently the majority of cloud providers – including Amazon’s Simple Storage Service 
(S3)13, the Google Compute Engine14 and the Citrix Cloud Platform15 - do not guarantee specific 
levels of security and privacy in their service level agreements (SLAs) as part of the contractual 
terms and conditions between cloud providers and consumers. This means that there are 
important concerns related to security and privacy that must be taken into consideration in using 
cloud computing by all parties involved in the cloud computing arena. These are discussed in the 
subsection 2.2.   
 
3.1. Security Issues in Cloud Computing 
• Multi-tenancy: Multi-tenancy refers to sharing physical devices and virtualized 
resources between multiple independent users. Using this kind of arrangement means that 
an attacker could be on the same physical machine as the target. Cloud providers use 
multi-tenancy features to build infrastructures that can efficiently scale to meet 
customers’ needs, however the sharing of resources means that it can be easier for an 
attacker to gain access to the target’s data. 
 
• Loss of Control: Loss of control is another potential breach of security that can occur 
where consumers’ data, applications, and resources are hosted at the cloud provider’s 
owned premises. As the users do not have explicit control over their data, this makes it 
possible for cloud providers to perform data mining over the users’ data, which can lead 
                                                           
11
 Google Container Engine, https://cloud.google.com/container-engine/ 
12
 Microsoft Azure Container, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/azure-container-service-now-and-the-future/ 
13
 Amazon S3 SLA, https://aws.amazon.com/s3/sla/ 
14
 Google Compute Engine SLA,  https://cloud.google.com/compute/sla 
15
 Citrix Cloud Platform SLA,  https://www.citrix.se/products/cloudplatform/overview.html 
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to security issues. In addition, when the cloud providers backup data at different data 
centers, the consumers cannot be sure that their data is completely erased everywhere 
when they delete their data. This has the potential to lead to misuse of the unerased data. 
In these types of situations where the consumers lose control over their data, they see the 
cloud provider as a black-box where they cannot directly monitor the resources 
transparently. 
 
• Trust Chain in Clouds: Trust plays an important role in attracting more consumers by 
assuring on cloud providers. Due to loss of control (as discussed earlier), cloud users rely 
on the cloud providers using trust mechanisms as an alternative to giving users 
transparent control over their data and cloud resources. Therefore cloud providers build 
confidence amongst their customers by assuring them that the provider's operations are 
certified in compliance with organizational safeguards and standards. 
 
3.2. Privacy Considerations of Processing Sensitive Data 
 
The security issues in cloud computing lead to a number of privacy concerns. Privacy is a 
complex topic that has different interpretations depending on contexts, cultures and communities, 
and it has been recognized as a fundamental human right by the United Nations [13]. It worth 
nothing that privacy and security are two distinct topics although security is generally necessary 
for providing privacy [1], [59]. 
 
Several efforts have been made to conceptualize privacy by jurists, philosophers, researchers, 
psychologists, and sociologists in order to give us a better understanding of privacy – for 
example, Alan Westin’s research in 1960 is considered to be the first significant work on the 
problem of consumer data privacy and data protection. Westin [14] defined privacy as follow. 
 
“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”  
 
The International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP)16 glossary 27 refers to privacy as 
the appropriate use of information under the circumstances. The notion of what constitutes 
appropriate handling of data handling varies depending on several factors such as individual 
preferences, the context of the situation, law, collection, how the data would be used and what 
information would be disclosed. 
 
In jurisdictions such as the US, “privacy” is the term that is used to encompass the relevant laws, 
policies and regulations, while in the EU the term “data protection” is more commonly used 
when referring to privacy laws and regulations. Legislation that aims to protect the privacy of 
individuals – such as the European Union (EU) DPD [1], the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
[15], the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) [16], and the HIPAA [2] – can become very 
complicated and have a variety of specific requirements. Organizations collecting and storing 
data in clouds that are subject to data protection regulations must ensure that the privacy of the 
data is preserved appropriately to lay the foundations for legal access to sensitive personal data. 
The development of a legal definition for cybercrime, the issue of jurisdiction (who is responsible 
for what information and where are they held responsible for it) and the regulation of data 
                                                           
16
 IAPP Glossary, https://iapp.org/resources/glossary 
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transfers to third countries [17] are among other challenging issues when it comes to security in 
cloud computing. For example, the DPD, which is the EU’s initial attempt at privacy protection, 
presents 72 recitals and 34 articles to harmonize the regulations for information flow within the 
EU Member States. 
The DPD highlights the demand for cross-border transfer of data through non-legislative 
measures and self-control. One example of where these types of privacy principles are being used 
is the Safe Harbor Agreement (SHA) which makes it possible transfer data to US-based cloud 
providers that are assumed to have appropriate data protection mechanisms. However, cloud 
carriers are not subject to the SHA, which leads to complexity in respect to international laws. 
There is an ongoing effort [18] to replace the EU DPD with a new a data protection regulation 
containing 91 articles that aims to lay out a data protection framework in Europe. The proposed 
regulations expand the definition of personal data protection to cover any information related to 
the people who are the subjects of the data, irrespective of whether the information is private, 
public or professional in nature. The regulations also include definitions of new roles related to 
handling data (such as data transfer officers) and propose restricting the transfer of data to third-
party countries that do not guarantee adequate levels of protection. Currently Argentina, Canada, 
Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, Israel, Switzerland, the US Safe Harbor Privacy Program, and 
the US Transfer of Air Passenger Name Data Record are considered to offer adequate protection. 
The new regulations consider imposing significant penalties for privacy breaches that result from 
violations of the regulations, for example, such a penalty could be 0.5 percent of the worldwide 
annual turnover of the offending enterprise. 
 
4. SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
 
This section reviews the research on security solution such as authentication, authorization, and 
identity management that were identified in Table 2.2 [10] as being necessary so that the 
activities of cloud providers are sufficiently secure. 
 
4.1 Authentication and Authorization 
In [19] the authors propose a credential classification and a framework for analyzing and 
developing solutions for credential management that include strategies to evaluate the complexity 
of cloud ecosystems. This study identifies a set of categories relevant for authentication and 
authorization for the cloud focusing on infrastructural organization which include classifications 
for credentials, and adapt those categories to the cloud context. The study also summarizes 
important factors that need to be taken into consideration when adopting or developing a solution 
for authentication and authorization – for example, identifying the appropriate requirements, 
categories, services, deployment models, lifecycle, and entities. In other work, a design model for 
multi-factor authentication in cloud computing environments is proposed in [20], and this model 
includes an analysis of the potential security threats in the proposed model. Another 
authentication solution is seen with MiLAMob [21], which provides a SaaS authentication 
middleware for mobile consumers of IaaS cloud applications. MiLAMob is a middleware-layer 
that handles the real-time authentication events on behalf of consumer devices with minimal 
HTTP traffic. The middleware currently supports mobile consumption of data on IaaS clouds 
such as Amazon’s S3. 
FermiCloud [22] uses another approach for authentication and authorization - it utilizes public 
key infrastructure (PKI) X.509 certificates for user identification and authentication. FermiCloud 
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is built in OpenNebula117 and it develops both X.509 authentication in Sunstone OpenNebula – a 
Web interface intended for user management – and X.509 authentication via command-line 
interfaces. To avoid the limitations of OpenNebula access control lists that are used for 
authorization after successful authentication of users, authors integrated an existing local 
credential mapping service. This solution has also been extended in cloud federations to authorize 
users across different cloud providers that have established trust relationships through trusted 
certification authorities.  
Tang et al. [23] introduce collaborative access control properties such as centralized facilities, 
agility, homogeneity, and outsourcing trust. They have introduced an authorization-as-a-service 
(AaaS) approach using a formalized multi-tenancy authorization system, and providing 
administrative control over enhanced fine-grained trust models. Integrating trust with 
cryptographic role-based access control (RBAC) [24] is another solution that ensures trust for 
secure sharing of data in the cloud. The authors propose using cryptographic RBAC to enforce 
authorization policies regarding the trustworthiness of roles that are evaluated by the data owner. 
Another feature of the authorization system in this solution is that it develops a new concept 
using role inheritance for evaluating the trustworthiness of the system. In another study, Sendo et 
al. [25] propose a user-centric approach for platform-level authorization of cloud services using 
the OAuth2 protocol to allow services to act on behalf of users when interacting with other 
services in order to avoid sharing usernames and passwords across service. 
 
4.2 Identity and Access Management 
 
The important functionalities of identity management systems for the success of clouds in 
relation to consumer satisfaction is discussed in [26]. The authors also present an authorization 
system for cloud federation using Shibboleth - an open source implementation of the security 
assertion markup language (SAML) for single sign-on with different cloud providers. This 
solution demonstrates how organizations can outsource authentication and authorization to third-
party clouds using an identity management system. Stihler et al. [27] also propose an integral 
federated identity management for cloud computing. A trust relationship between a given user 
and SaaS domains is required so that SaaS users can access the application and resources that are 
provided. In a PaaS domain, there is an interceptor that acts as a proxy to accept the user’s 
requests and execute them. The interceptor interacts with the secure token service (STS), and 
requests the security token using the WS-Trust specification. 
 
IBHMCC [28] is another solution that contains identity-based encryption (IBE) and identity-
based signature (IBS) schemes. Based on the IBE and IBS schemes, an identity-based 
authentication for cloud computing has been proposed. The idea is based on the identity-based 
hierarchical model for cloud computing along with the corresponding encryption and signature 
schemes without using certificates for simplified key management. 
 
Contrail [29] is another approach that aims to enhance integration among heterogeneous clouds 
both vertically and horizontally. Vertical integration provides a unified platform for the different 
kinds of resources while horizontal integration abstracts the interaction models of different cloud 
providers. In [29] the authors develop a horizontal federation scheme as a requirement for vertical 
integration. The proposed federation architecture contains several layers, such as users’ identities, 
                                                           
17
 http://opennebula.org/ 
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business logic and a federation manager to support APIs for resources, storage, and networking 
across different providers. 
 
E-ID authentication and uniform access to cloud storage service providers [30] is an effort to 
build identity management systems for authenticating Portuguese citizens using national e-
identification cards for cloud storage systems. In this approach, the OAuth protocol is integrated 
for authorizing the cloud users. The e-ID cards contain PKI certificates that are signed by several 
levels of governmental departments. A certification authority is responsible for issuing the e-ID 
cards and verifying them. The e-ID cards enable users for identity-based encryption of data in 
cloud storage.  
 
In [31], the authors consider the issues related to inter-cloud federation and the proposed 
ICEMAN identity management architecture. ICEMAN discusses identity life cycle, self-service, 
key management, provisioning and deprovisioning functionalities that need to be included in an 
appropriate intercloud identity management system.  
 
The EGI delivered a hybrid federated cloud [32] as a collaboration of communities developing, 
innovating, operating and using clouds for research and education. The EGI federated cloud 
provides IaaS, persistent block storage attached to VMs, and object-level storage for transparent 
data sharing. The EGI controls access to resources using X.509 certificates and the concept of 
“Virtual Organization” (VO). VO refers to a dynamic set of users or institutions using resource-
sharing rules and conditions. The authorization attributes are issued through a VO management 
system that can be integrated with SAML for federation.  
 
4.3 Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
 
Santos et al. [33] extend the Terra [34] design that enables users to verify the integrity of VMs in 
the cloud. The proposed solution is called the trusted cloud computing platform (TCCP), and the 
whole IaaS is considered to be a single system instead of granular hosts in Terra. In this 
approach, all nodes run a trusted virtual machine monitor to isolate and protect virtual machines. 
Users are given access to cloud services through the cloud manager component. The external 
trusted entity (ETE) is another component that provides a trust coordinator service in order to 
keep track of the trusted VMs in a cluster. The ETE can be used to attest the security of the VMs. 
A TCCP guarantees confidentiality and integrity in data and computation and it also enables 
users to attest to the cloud service provider to ensure whether the services are secure prior to 
setting up their VMs. These features are based on the trusted platform module (TPM) chip. The 
TPM contains a private endorsement key that uniquely identifies the TPM and some 
cryptographic functions that cannot be altered. 
 
In 2011, Popa et al. proposed CloudProof [35] as a secure storage system to guarantee 
confidentiality, integrity and write-serializability using verifiable proofs of violation by external 
third parties. Confidentiality is ensured by private keys that are known only to the owner of the 
data that is to be encrypted. The main idea behind CloudProof is the use of the attestation 
mechanism. Attestations provide proof of sanity of users, data owners and cloud service 
providers. Data owners use a block identifier to acquire the content of a block. This mechanism 
enables users to store data by putting a block identifier and the contents of the block in the cloud. 
The attestation structure implements a solution called “block hash” for performing integrity 
checks through signature verification. The block hash provides proof for write-serializabilty 
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using a forked sequence of the attestations while a chain hash is used for a broken chain of 
attestations which are not sequenced correctly. 
 
Fuzzy authorization (FA) for cloud storage [36] is another flexible and scalable approach to 
enable data to be shared securely among cloud participants. FA ensures confidentiality, integrity 
and secure access control by utilizing secret sharing schemes for users with smartphones who are 
using the cloud services. 
 
In [37] the authors define threats to cloud server hypervisors thorough analysis of the codebase of 
two popular open-source hypervisors: Xen and KVM. In addition, they discuss the vulnerabilities 
reports associated with them. As a result, a model is proposed for characterization of hypervisor 
vulnerabilities in three dimensions: the trigger source, the attack vector and the attack target.  The 
attack vector consists of the Hypervisor functionality that makes security breaches possible - for 
example, virtual CPUs, symmetric multiprocessing, soft memory management units, interrupt 
and timer mechanisms, IO and networking, paravirtualized IO, VM exits, hypercalls, VM 
management (configure, start, pause and stop VMs), remote management, and software 
hypervisor add-ons. Successful exploitation of a vulnerability in these functionalities enables an 
attacker to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the Hypervisor or one of 
its guest VMs. 
 
The vulnerability reports in [37] show 59 vulnerability cases for Xen and 38 cases for KVM. 
Approximately 50 percent of these vulnerabilities are the same for Xen a dKVM and consist of 
issues relating to confidentiality, integrity and availability. The remote management software of 
Xen contributes to 15.3 percent of the vulnerabilities that demonstrates the increase attack surface 
by non-essential services. The VM management component contributes to 11.9 percent of the 
vulnerabilities in Xen compared to 5.3 percent in KVM. The lower vulnerability rate in KVM is 
due to the libvirt toolkit inside the hypervisor, whereas Xen’s decision to allocate an entire 
privileged is done in Dom0. Other factors that have been studied in [20] are trigger sources and 
likely attack targets, including the overall network, the guest VM’s user-space, the guest VM’s 
kernel-space, the Dom0/host OS, and the hypervisor. The most common trigger source is the 
guest VM user-space, which gives rise to 39.0 percent of Xen’s and 34.2 percent of KVM’s 
vulnerabilities. This makes it possible for any user-space guest VM to be a threat to the 
hypervisor. The guest VM kernel-space has around 32 percent of the total vulnerabilities in both 
cases. The authors show Dom0 to be a more common target than the hypervisor in Xen, whereas 
the host OS in KVM is a less common target compared to the hypervisor. The location of the IO 
device emulation back-end drivers plays an important factor in this difference. The IO and 
network device emulation functionalities cause one third of the 15 vulnerabilities in both. 
 
In [38] the authors propose Swap and Play as a new approach for live updating of hypervisors 
without the need to reboot the VM for high availability. The proposed design is scalable, usable 
and applicable in cloud environments and it has been implemented in Xen as one of the most 
popular hypervisors. Swap and Play provides methods to transfer the in-memory state of the 
running hypervisor to the updating state, in addition to updating the underlying host. Swap and 
Play consists of three independent phases: preparation, distribution and update. In the preparation 
phase information for the later state transfer is collected. The distribution phase deploys the 
update package on the target host for updating. In the last step, the update package is patched to 
individual hosts in the cloud. Each host applies the update package independently of the others 
and does not require any network resources. The Xen implementation of the Swap and Play 
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solution is called SwapVisor. SwapVisor introduces a new hypercall in the Xen architecture. A 
hypercall is a trap from a domain to the hypervisor (similar to a syscall from an application to the 
kernel). Hypercalls are used by domains to request privileged operations such as updating page 
tables. The experiments show that updating from Xen version 4.2.0 to version 4.2.1 is fulfilled 
within approximately 45 ms which seems to be intangible and have almost zero effect on the 
network performance.  
 
Klein et al. [39] improve cloud service resilience using a load-balancing mechanism called 
brownout. The idea behind this solution is to maximize the optional contents to provide a solution 
that is resilient to volatility in terms of flash crowds and capacity shortages (through load-
balancing over replicas) when compared to other approaches that are implemented using 
response-time or queue length. In another effort [40] the authors proposed a synchronization 
mechanism for cloud accounting systems that are distributed. The run time resource usage 
generated from different clusters is synchronized to maintain a single cloud-wide view of the data 
so that a single bill can be created.  The authors also proposed a set of accounting system 
requirements and an evaluation method which verifies that the solution fulfills these 
requirements. 
 
4.4 Security Monitoring and Incident Response 
 
Anand [41] presents a centralized monitoring solution for cloud applications consisting of 
monitoring the server, monitors, agents, configuration files and notification components. 
Redundancy, automatic healing, and multi-level notifications are other benefits of the proposed 
solution which are designed to avoid the typical drawbacks of a centralized monitoring system, 
such as limited scalability, low performance and single point of failure. 
 
Brinkmann et al. [42] present a scalable distributed monitoring system for clouds using a 
distributed management tree that covers all the protocol-specific parameters for data collection. 
Data acquisition is done through specific handler implementations for each infrastructure-level 
data supplier. Data suppliers provide interoperability with cloud software, virtualization libraries 
and OS-level monitoring tools. The authors review the limitations of existing intrusion detection 
systems and discuss VM-level intrusion detection as an emerging area for securing VMs in cloud 
environments. The requirements for an efficient intrusion detection system for cloud 
infrastructures – including multi-tenancy, scalability and availability – are identified and a VM 
introspection detection mechanism via a hypervisor is proposed. 
 
Hypervisor-based cloud intrusion detection systems are a new approach (compared to existing 
host-based and network-based intrusion detection systems) that is discussed in [43]. The idea is to 
use hypervisor capabilities to improve performance over data residing in a VM. Performance 
metrics are defined as networking transmitted and received data, read/write over data blocks, and 
CPU utilization. These metrics are retrieved in near real-time intervals by endpoint agents that are 
connected directly to a controller that analyzes the collected data using signatures to find any 
malicious activity. The controller component sends an alert to a notification service in case there 
is any potential attack.  
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4.5 Security Policy Management 
 
In [44] the authors propose a generic security management framework allowing providers of 
cloud data management systems to define and enforce complex security policies through a policy 
management module. The user activities are stored and monitored for each storage system, and 
are made available to the policy management module. Users’ actions are evaluated by a trust 
management module based on their past activities and are grouped as “fair” or “malicious”. An 
appropriate architecture for security management which satisfies the requirements of policy 
definitions (such as flexibility, expressiveness, extendibility and correctness) has been 
implemented. The authors evaluated the proposed system on a data management system that is 
built on data storage. 
 
Takabi et al. [45] introduce policy management as a service (PMaaS) to provide users with a 
unified control point for managing access policies in order to control access to cloud resources 
independently of the physical location of cloud providers. PMaaS is designed specifically to 
solve the issue of having multiple access control authorization mechanisms employed by cloud 
service providers that restrict the flexibility of applying custom access control to a particular 
service. For this purpose, the PMaaS architecture includes a policy management service provider 
that is the entry point for cloud users to define and manage the policies. The cloud service 
provider imports the user-defined policies and acts a policy decision point to enforce the user 
policies.   
 
The challenges associated with policy enforcement in heterogeneous distributed environments are 
discussed in [46].  The authors propose a framework to support flexible policy enforcement and a 
feedback system using rule- and context-based access control to inform cloud users about the 
effect of defined policies. There are three main requirements for building a general policy 
enforcement framework. First it must support various data types such as image, structured and 
textual data. Secondly, in a distributed environment there need to be several compute engines 
such as Map/Reduce, relational database management systems or clusters. Finally, access policy 
requirements in terms of access control policies, data sharing policies, and privacy policies need 
to be integrated with the general policy management framework.  Several policy enforcement 
mechanisms (such as extensible access control markup language or inline-reference monitors to 
enforce user-centric policies in accord with cloud provider approval) were also discussed.  
 
In [47] the authors describe A4Cloud with the aim of developing solutions to ensure 
accountability and transparency in cloud environments. Users need to be able to track their data 
usage to know how the cloud provider satisfies their expectations for data protection. For this 
purpose cloud providers must employ solutions that provide users with appropriate control and 
transparency over their data, e.g. tools to define policies for compliance with regulatory 
frameworks. In another effort [48] the authors discuss the issue of usable transparent data 
processing in cloud computing and also consider how to enable users to define transparency 
policies over their data. They identify the requirements for transparent policy management in the 
cloud based on two aspects: user demands and legal aspects of transparent data processing.  
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5. PRIVACY-PRESERVATION FOR SENSITIVE DATA IN CLOUD  
COMPUTING 
 
Over the time, organizations have collected valuable information about the individuals in our 
societies that contain sensitive information, e.g. medical data. Researchers need to access and 
analyze such data using big data technologies [63], [64], [65] in cloud computing, while 
organizations are required to enforce data protection compliance (subsection 3.2).  
 
There has been considerable progress on privacy preservation for sensitive data in both industry 
and academia, e.g., solutions that develop protocols and tools for anonymization or encryption of 
data for confidentiality purposes. This section categorizes work related to this area according to 
different privacy protection requirements. However, these solutions have not yet been widely 
adopted by cloud service providers or organizations. 
 
Pearson [1] discusses a range of security and privacy challenges that are raised by 
cloud computing. Lack of user control, lack of training and expertise, unauthorized secondary 
usage, complexity of regulatory compliance, transborder data flow restrictions and litigation are 
among the challenges faced in cloud computing environments. In [66], the authors describe the 
privacy challenges of genomic data in the cloud including terms of services of cloud providers 
that are not developed with a healthcare mindset, awareness of patient to upload their data into 
the cloud without their consent, multi-tenancy, data monitoring, data security and accountability. 
The authors also provide recommendations for data owners when aiming to use cloud provider 
services. 
 
In [49] the authors discussed several privacy issues associated with genomic sequencing. This 
study also described several open research problems (such as outsourcing to cloud providers, 
genomic data encryption, replication, integrity, and removal of genomic data) along with giving 
suggestions to improve privacy through collaboration between different entities and 
organizations. In another effort [50], raw genomic data storage through encrypted short reads is 
proposed.  
 
Outsourcing privacy is another topic that is discussed in [51].  The authors define the concept of 
“outsourcing privacy” where a database owner updates the database over time on untrusted 
servers. This definition assumes that database clients and the untrusted servers are not able to 
learn anything about the contents of the databases without authorized access. The authors 
implements a server-side indexing structure to produce a system that allows a single database 
owner to privately and efficiently write data to, and multiple database clients to privately read 
data from, an outsourced database.  
 
Homomorphic encryption is another privacy-preserving solution that is based on the idea of 
computing over encrypted data without knowing the keys belonging to different parties. To 
ensure confidentiality, the data owner may encrypt data with a public key and store data in the 
cloud. When the process engine reads the data, there is no need to have the DP’s private key to 
decrypt the data. In private computation on encrypted genomic data [52], the authors proposed a 
privacy-preserving model for genomic data processing using homomorphic encryption on 
genome-wide association studies. 
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Anonymization is another approach to ensure the privacy of sensitive data. SAIL [53] provides 
individual-level information on the availability of data types within a collection. Researchers are 
not able to cross-link (which is similar to an equality join in SQL) data from different outside 
studies, as the identities of the samples are anonymized. In another effort [57] the authors propose 
an integration architecture to make it possible to perform aggregated queries over anonymized 
medical data sets from different data providers. In this solution, data providers remove the data 
subjects’ identifiers and apply a two-level encryption using hashing and PKI certificates. The 
sensitive information will then be anonymized using an open-source toolkit and will be encrypted 
granularly using the cloud provider’s public key. ScaBIA [60] is another solution for processing 
and storing anonymized brain imaging data in cloud. This approach provides PKI authentication 
for administrator roles to deploy a PaaS middleware and defines researchers as users in the in 
Microsoft Azure cloud. Researchers are allowed to login by username/password to run statistical 
parametric mapping workflows within isolated generic worker containers. The brain imaging 
datasets and related results can be shared by the researchers using a RBAC model over secure 
HTTPS connections. 
 
In [54], the design and implementation of a security framework for BiobankCloud, a platform 
that supports the secure storage and processing of genomic data in cloud computing 
environments, has been discussed. The proposed framework is built on the cloud privacy threat 
modeling approach [55], [56] which is used to define the privacy threat model for processing 
next-generation sequencing data according to the DPD [2]. This solution includes a flexible two-
factor authentication and an RBAC access control mechanism, in addition to auditing 
mechanisms to ensure that the requirements of the DPD are fulfilled.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper surveyed recent advances in cloud computing security and privacy research. It 
described several cloud computing key concepts and technologies, such as virtualization, and 
containers. We also discussed several security challenges that are raised by existing or 
forthcoming privacy legislation, such as the EU DPD and the HIPAA.  
 
The results that are presented in the area of cloud security and privacy are based on cloud 
provider activities, such as providing orchestration, resource abstraction, physical resource and 
cloud service management layers. Security and privacy factors that affect the activities of cloud 
providers in relation to the legal processioning of consumer data were identified and a review of 
existing research was conducted to summarize the state-of-the-art in the field. 
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